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1Off-the-Hook : An Efficient and Usable
Client-Side Phishing Prevention Application
Samuel Marchal, Member, IEEE , Giovanni Armano, Tommi Gro¨ndahl, Kalle Saari, Nidhi Singh and
N. Asokan, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Phishing is a major problem on the Web. Despite the significant attention it has received over the years, there has been no
definitive solution. While the state-of-the-art solutions have reasonably good performance, they suffer from several drawbacks including
potential to compromise user privacy, difficulty of detecting phishing websites whose content change dynamically, and reliance on
features that are too dependent on the training data.
To address these limitations we present a new approach for detecting phishing webpages in real-time as they are visited by a browser.
It relies on modeling inherent phisher limitations stemming from the constraints they face while building a webpage. Consequently, the
implementation of our approach, Off-the-Hook , exhibits several notable properties including high accuracy, brand-independence and
good language-independence, speed of decision, resilience to dynamic phish and resilience to evolution in phishing techniques.
Off-the-Hook is implemented as a fully-client-side browser add-on, which preserves user privacy. In addition, Off-the-Hook identifies
the target website that a phishing webpage is attempting to mimic and includes this target in its warning. We evaluated Off-the-Hook in
two different user studies. Our results show that users prefer Off-the-Hook warnings to Firefox warnings.
Index Terms—Phishing webpage detection, phishing prevention, phishing target identification, machine learning, web security,
browser add-on.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Phishing webpages (“phishs”) lure unsuspecting web surfers into
revealing sensitive information. It is a major security concern
on the web, Many solutions have been proposed to detect and
avoid phishs. Nevertheless, phishing detection remains an arms
race with no definitive solution. Automated phish detection sys-
tems [1], [2] with acceptable accuracy (>99%) and achieving
very low rates of misclassifying legitimate webpages (<0.1%)
are computationally expensive and slow. Thus, they are typically
used in a centralized architecture (e.g. Google Safe Browsing [3],
PhishTank [4]) where a blacklist of phishing sites is constructed
based on offline analysis of websites. This raises major issues
including several days of delay in phish identification [5] and
vulnerability to dynamic phishing where a phishing website serves
different content depending on who the client is. In addition, users
must share their browsing history with these centralized services
thereby compromising their privacy. These concerns are partially
addressed by real-time client-side solutions, but existing client-
side solutions typically have low detection accuracy [6].
Most techniques [1], [2], [3] primarily use a bag-of-words
approach and are thus language and brand-dependent. While they
can be effective at detecting phishs against known target “brand”
(like “paypal”), they are not effective against phishs masquerading
as brands that were not known targets. Use of static words as
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features in a phish detection model makes it more vulnerable to
circumvention by including specific words that can increase the
chance of a phish being misclassified as legitimate [7]. Finally,
phishing warnings in today’s web browsers (e.g. Chromium,
Firefox) have two drawbacks. First, users are only told that the
website they are trying to access is a phish. We argue that a
more useful guidance would be to point the user towards the
legitimate website that they intended to visit in the first place.
Second, warning messages typically use technical jargon which
make them difficult to understand [8].
In this paper, we introduce a new phish detection tool, Off-
the-Hook. It is implemented as a browser add-on that can decide
in real time if a visited webpage is a phish. On encountering a
phish, Off-the-Hook identifies the target brand mimicked by the
phish. Off-the-Hook implementation is fully-client-side and the
decision process relies solely on information extracted from the
web browser while loading a webpage. Thus it preserves users’
privacy, provides real-time protection and is resilient to dynamic
phish since the content actually loaded in the browser is analyzed
to render a decision.
The core of Off-the-Hook lies in modeling inherent phisher
limitations evident in the composition of phishing webpages. For
instance, external hyperlinks and external content sources on a
phish point to domains that are typically outside the control of
the phisher. Moreover, while phishers can freely change most
of the phishing page, the latter part of its domain name is
constrained as it is limited to those domains that are generally
controlled by phishers. By measuring differences in the composi-
tion and consistency of term usage in constrained/unconstrained
and controlled/uncontrolled sources, we improve the effectiveness
of phish detection. Modeling phishers’ limitations that typically
remain constant over time makes our detection model hard to
circumvent and resilient to evolution in phishing techniques. The
2use of a small number of non-static features (210) allows fast
decision (<0.5 second), high accuracy (99.9%) and low rate of
mislabeling legitimate websites (<0.1%), with very little labeled
training data. By eschewing the bag-of-words approach Off-the-
Hook is not limited to specific languages or targeted brands.
In case of a phish, Off-the-Hook uses simple language to
formulate the warning to users and points them to the likely
target of the phish. We evaluated Off-the-Hook in two user studies
showing that it is likely to be acceptable to user.
We claim the following contributions :
• the design and implementation of a client-side-only phish
detection tool: Off-the-Hook (Sect. 3). It offers (a) better
privacy, (b) real-time protection, (c) resilience to dynamic
phish and (d) effective warnings.
• a new set of features to detect phishs (Sect. 4.3) and a
classifier, using these features. Unlike previous work, our
approach is brand-independent, provides good language-
independence and learns a generalized model for detecting
phishs making it resilient to evolution in phishing tech-
niques.
• a fast target identification technique (Sect. 5) with accu-
racy (90-97%) comparable to previously reported techniques.
Identified likely targets are included as redirection options
in phishing warnings.
• a comprehensive evaluation of the application, showing that
its accuracy (>99.9%) and misclassification rate (<0.1%) are
comparable to state-of-the-art while being client-side-only
(Sect. 6) .
• two usability studies of Off-the-Hook (Sect. 7) showing that
it is usable and its warnings are preferred to Firefox
warnings.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Phishing
Phishing refers to the class of attacks where a victim is lured
to a fake webpage masquerading as a target website and is
deceived into disclosing personal data or credentials. Phishing
campaigns are typically conducted using spam emails to drive
users to fake websites [9]. Impersonation techniques range from
technical subterfuges (email spoofing, DNS spoofing, etc.) to
social engineering. The former is used by technically skilled
phishers while unskilled phishers resort to the latter. Phishs mimic
the look and feel of their target websites [10]. In order to make
the phishs believable, phishers may embed some content (HTML
code, images, etc.) taken directly from the target website and
use relatively little content that they themselves host [11]. This
includes outgoing links pointing to the target website. They also
use keywords referring to the target in different elements of the
phishs (title, text, images, links) [9], [11], [12], [13].
2.2 URL Structure
A webpage is typically addressed by a uniform resource locator
(URL), which typically has the structure as shown in Fig. 1.
It begins with the protocol used to access the page. The fully
qualified domain name (FQDN) identifies the server hosting the
webpage. The FQDN in turn, consists of a registered domain name
(RDN) and prefix which we refer to as subdomains. A phisher has
full control over the subdomains portion and can set it to any
value. The RDN portion is constrained since it has to be registered
with a domain name registrar. RDN is composed of a public suffix
(ps) preceded by a main level domain (mld). The URL may also
have a path and query components which, too, can be changed
by the phisher at will. We use the term FreeURL to refer to those
parts of the URL that are fully controllable by the phisher.
protocol://[subdomains.]mld.ps[/path][?query]
FQDN
RDNFreeURL FreeURL
Fig. 1: Structure of a URL
Consider an example URL:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/ap/signin? encoding=UTF8
We can identify the following components:
• protocol = https
• FQDN = www.amazon.co.uk
• RDN = amazon.co.uk
• mld = amazon
• FreeURL = {www, /ap/signin? encoding=UTF8}
2.3 Data Sources
Our analysis of phishs (that are loaded in a web browser) yields
the following data sources that can be useful in detecting phishs:
• Starting URL: the URL provided to the user to access the
website. It can be distributed in emails, instant messages,
websites, documents, etc.
• Landing URL: the final URL pointing to the actual content
presented to the user in his web browser (this is the URL
shown in the browser address bar when the page is com-
pletely loaded).
• Redirection chain: the set of URLs requested to go from the
starting URL to the landing URL (including both).
• Logged links: the set of URLs logged by the browser while
loading the page. They generally point to sources from which
embedded content (code, images, etc.) in the webpage are
loaded.
• HTML: the HTML source code of the webpage and iFrames
included in the page. We consider four elements extracted
from this source code:
– Text: text contained between <body> HTML tags (actu-
ally rendered on user’s display).
– Title: text contained between <title> HTML tags (appears
in the browser tab title).
– HREF links: the set of URLs representing outgoing links
in the webpage.
– Copyright: the copyright notice, if any, in Text.
3 Off-the-Hook DESIGN
3.1 Design Goals
We designed Off-the-Hook to satisfy a number of requirements:
• Accuracy (R1): misidentification of legitimate webpages as
phishs (false positives) must be minimal to avoid harming
usability. Detection rate of phishs (recall) must be maximal
to provide good protection.
• Context-independent detection (R2): the detection model
must not rely on features specific to a particular target or
language.
3• Temporal resilience (R3): detection accuracy must not de-
grade over time as phishers adapt their techniques.
• Resilience to dynamic phishs (R4): the phish or not-phish de-
cision must be based on the actual webpage content depicted
in the browser.
• User privacy (R5): phish detection must not require users
having to disclose their browsing history to any outside party.
• Effective protection (R6): to protect users before they dis-
close passwords or other sensitive information to a phisher,
detection must take place quickly (<1 second). Warning
messages must be clear and easily understandable. They
must provide both relevant information about the threat and
relevant continuation options.
3.2 Design Choices
To meet the aforementioned requirements we adopted the follow-
ing design choices:
• Client-side implementation: Off-the-Hook is fully imple-
mented on the client-side. It computes its decision based on
the webapge content actually displayed in the browser. It is
thus privacy preserving (R5) and is not vulnerable to dynamic
phishs (R4).
• Model phisher limitations: the detection model relies on
inherent phisher limitations (Sect. 4.1). Thus, we expect these
limitations to be present in any phish, which will make the
detection accurate (R1). Those limitations will also remain
over time and are difficult to circumvent, thus allowing the
detection technique to be temporally resilient (R3).
• Use few but non-static features: the features used for the
model are non-static: they represent phisher limitations rather
than static words found in training data. The detection is thus
context-independent (R2). Using a small number of features
allows the decision to be fast (R6).
3.3 Decision Flow
Off-the-Hook’s overall decision process, depicted in Fig. 2 in-
volves two main components: a phish detector and a target
identifier. The phish detector is a classifier that identifies phishs
based on a set of new features (Sect. 4). The target identifier finds
the likely target of a phish based on “keyterms” in a webpage
(Sect. 5). The system is complemented by a local whitelist that
can preempt any webpage from being analyzed. It is composed
from previous corrective decisions.
When the browser visits a URL, the data sources of the cor-
responding webpage are extracted. If the landing URL belongs to
the whitelist, the webpage is considered legitimate and no further
analysis is performed. Otherwise, the extracted data sources are
fed to the phish detector that classifies the page as “phish” or
“not-phish”. If the decision is “phish”, the target identifier infers
the list of likely targets. If one of the target matches the landing
URL, the tentative decision of the phish detector is overruled by
the target identifier and the page is deemed legitimate. If not, the
page is confirmed as phish and its target is identified. The results
are communicated to the user via color-coded icons and messages
as shown in Fig. 2.
3.4 Architecture and Implementation
Off-the-Hook is implemented as a web browser add-on for Google
Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, and distributed for Windows (≥ 8),
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Fig. 2: Off-the-Hook decision process and warning messages
Ubuntu (≥ 12.04) and OS X (≥ 10.8). A beta version is publicly
available for download [14]. Its implementation architecture is
depicted in Fig. 3.
Add-on is developed in Javascript and interacts with the web
browser. It collects the required data sources (Section 2.3) and
displays the phishing decision indicator and any needed message
in the browser window. The add-on is composed of the content
script and the background script.
Background processes are developed in Python and executed in
separated processes to handle the analysis of data extracted from
the webpages. They consist of the phish detector (Sect. 4) and
the target identifier (Sect. 5). The dispatcher handles the data
exchanged between these processes and the add-on.
Fig. 3: Software implementation architecture
Background script runs concurrently with the browser to collect
the redirection chain and the logged links every time a new web-
page is loaded (1). It sends the collected data to the corresponding
instance of the content script (2). When all data sources are
extracted, the background script forwards them to the dispatcher
(4). It later sends the computed result of phish detection and target
identification back to the content script (6a)(6b).
Content script is executed at every page load to combine the data
collected by the background script with the information extracted
from the webpage (3). It gathers title, text, HREF links and HTML
source and combine them with redirection chain and logged links
to generate a json file containing all the data sources. It sends
this file to the background processes for analysis (4). When it
receives the result from the phish detector (6a), in case of a phish,
it blocks users’ interaction with the webpage (7a) until results from
the target identifier are returned (6b). Then, it either displays a
warning or a confirmation of the webpage legitimacy depending on
4target identification results (7b). There is one instance of content
script running per opened browser tab.
Dispatcher waits for incoming json files from the content scripts
(4). It checks the landing URL against the whitelist to determinate
if the page has to be analyzed. If the URL is not found in the
whitelist, the data is forwarded to the phish detector (5a) and to
one instance of the target identifier (5b) for processing. Results of
phish detection are forwarded to the content script (6a). Received
target domains (6b) are checked against the landing URL. If the
RDN of any target corresponds to the RDN of the landing URL,
the webpage is considered as legitimate. The URL is added to the
local whitelist and the decision is transmitted to the content script.
Alternatively, the list of targets is sent (6b). The local whitelist
is supplied with landing URLs from which the target identifier
confirms the legitimacy of the webpage while the phish detector
predicted it as phish. A second source of whitelisted URLs is when
the user overrides the result of phish detection.
Phish detector extracts a feature vector (Sect. 4.3) from the data
sources received from the content script and performs the classi-
fication of the website (5a). It sends the result of the classification
to the content script through the dispatcher.
Target identifier infers the potential targets of the phish (5b)
based on the information contained in multiple data sources
(Sect. 5.2). Once the targets are identified, it sends them to the
dispatcher (6b). Since this task is relatively more time consuming
(cf. Sect. 6.5), two instances of target identifiers run concurrently.
We designed the software architecture of Off-the-Hook to be
independent from any system and hardware. We developed it in
high level programming languages, i.e. Python and Javascript, to
be portable with minimal changes to the largest class of devices
and operating systems. Nevertheless, browsers expose different
functions for extracting data sources and our add-on thus has
browser-specific Javascript artifacts. One way to eliminate such
browser-dependencies is to use cross-browser extension frame-
works such as KangoExtensions [15] or BestToolBars [16]. They
enable the use of a single code base for all browsers addressed by
the framework e.g. Firefox, Chrome, Safari, etc. However, popular
browser platforms like Google Chrome have recently started to
block non-self-contained add-ons (which make use of external
libraries) from being published in their market places.
We developed background processes in Python because they
rely on the availability of machine learning libraries that are not
yet available in Javascript. Since these background processes are
external programs running concurrently with the browser, they
require operating system specific packaging.
An optimal implementation of Off-the-Hook would be native
integration in a browser, similarly to existing phishing prevention
systems like Google Safe Browsing [3]. Such a solution would
permit a native implementation of the whole system in a single
language, e.g. C, increasing performance and reducing the com-
munication overhead between different programs.
3.5 User Interface
The user interface is designed to meet a trade-off between salience
and ease of understanding. Phishing warnings are implemented as
active warnings that interrupt users’ task and move their attention
to the message, which guarantees their efficiency [8], [17] We used
a cognitive walkthrough [18] during the development of Off-the-
Hook to refine the layout and content of various notifications and
Fig. 4: Off-the-Hook warning message (Google Chrome extension)
warnings. The resulting interface has minimal jargon and textual
content: the phishing warning shows a minimal message along
with options for continuation (Fig. 4). The user interface displays
the four following elements:
Navigation bar icon is composed of Off-the-Hook’s logo com-
bined with a colored badge. A green badge indicates a legitimate
webpage and a red badge indicates a phish (Fig. 4: top-right).
Loading screen is a layer that prevents users’ interaction with the
webpage. It is composed of a semi-transparent layer that covers
the webpage entirely. An animated Off-the-Hook icon occupies the
center of the loading screen. This loading screen appears when the
phish detector predicts a page as a phish, and remains until the
target identifier provides its result.
Warning message pops up in the center of the window and is
surrounded by a semi-transparent layer (Fig. 4). It contains infor-
mation understandable by ordinary, non-expert users. The warning
message provides continuation options that allow users to proceed
to the website, with an option to remember the decision having
the effect of adding the landing URL to the local whitelist. They
can close the browser’s tab. In contrast with existing warnings [8],
we leverage our target identifier to propose links redirecting to the
possible target of the phish.
Safe toast notification consists of a green logo placed on the top-
right of the browser window. It is displayed for five seconds after
the loading screen to indicate that a webpage is legitimate, when
the target identifier overrides the phish detector.
The navigation bar icon is is always present. The other
elements are displayed depending on phish detection and target
identification results for a certain webpage as observed in Fig. 2.
4 PHISH DETECTION
4.1 Modeling Phisher Limitations
We recall that even on systems they control, phishers are
constrained from freely constructing URLs to pages they host
(Sect. 2.2). Similarly, in order to maximize the believability of
their phishs, phishers include content from URLs outside their
control (Sect. 2.1). Thus, we divide the data sources from Sect. 2.3
into subcategories according to the level of control phishers may
have on them and the constraints on phishers.
Control: URLs from logged links and HREF links are subdivided
into internal and external according to their RDN. The set of RDNs
5extracted from URLs involved in the redirection chain are assumed
to be under the control of the webpage owner. Any URLs that
include these RDNs are marked internal. Other RDNs are assumed
to be possibly outside the control of the webpage owner. URLs
containing such RDNs are marked external.
Constraints: Within a URL, we distinguish between RDN, which
cannot be freely defined by the webpage owner, and FreeURL,
which can be. RDN is thus constrained by DNS registration
policies and FreeURL is unconstrained.
4.2 Extracting Term Distributions
While facing the aforementionned limitations, the primary tech-
nique of a phisher is essentially social engineering: fooling a
victim into believing that the phish is the target [19]. Thus, it
is plausible that lexical analysis of the data sources will help in
identifying phishs: we conjecture that legitimate webpages and
phishs differ in the way terms are used in different locations in
those pages. To incorporate measurements of such term usage
consistency, we first define what “terms” are and how they are
extracted from a webpage. Let A be the set of the 26 lowercase
English letters: A = {a, b, c, ..., x, y, z}. We extract terms from a
data source as follows:
• canonicalize letter characters by mapping upper case charac-
ters, accented characters and special characters to a matching
letter in A; e.g., { B, β, b`, bˆ } → b.
• split the input into substrings whenever a character c /∈ A is
encountered.
• throw away any substring whose length is less than 3.
Let T = An|n ≥ 3 be the set of all possible terms. Suppose
TS = {ti∈{1;m} ∈ T} was extracted from a data source S and
ti occurs with probability pi. The set of m pairs (ti, pi) ∈ T ×
]0, 1] , i ∈ {1;m} represents the term distribution DS of S.
TABLE 1: Term distributions with indicator showing if they are
controlled or uncontrolled / constrained or unconstrained
Distribution Data source Cont./Constr.
Dtext Text yes / no
Dtitle Title yes / no
Dcopyright Copyright notice yes / no
Dstart Starting URL – FreeURL yes / no
Dland Landing URL – FreeURL yes / no
Dintlog Internal logged links – FreeURL yes / no
Dintlink Internal HREF links – FreeURL yes / no
Dstartrdn Starting URL – RDN yes / yes
Dlandrdn Landing URL – RDN yes / yes
Dintrdn Internal links (HREF & logged) – RDN yes / yes
Dextrdn External logged links – RDN no / yes
Dextlog External logged links – FreeURL no / no
Dextlink External HREF links – FreeURL no / no
Tab. 1 defines the term distributions we consider. The external
sources extrdn, extlog, extlink are those assumed to be outside
the control of the webpage owner. RDN data sources startrdn,
landrdn, intrdn, extrdn are constrained by DNS registration.
The rest is controlled by the webpage owner without constraints.
4.3 Computing Features
We now introduce a set of 210 features and motivate their selec-
tion. We intend to capture the constraints and degree of control
discussed earlier (Sect. 4.1) as well as consistency checking of
term usage (Sect. 4.2). We group features into the following five
categories (Tab. 2).
TABLE 2: Feature sets used for phish detection
Name Count Type
f1 92 URL
f2 68 Term usage consistency
f3 32 Usage of starting and landing mld
f4 13 RDN usage
f5 5 Webpage content
fall 210 Entire feature set
URL: First we define eight statistical features related to the
lexical composition of URLs (Tab. 3). Feature 2 is meant to
identify strings in path and query that look like domain names.
Phishing URL and domain name obfuscation techniques [12] tend
to produce long URLs composed of many terms. This is the
rationale for features 3-8.
TABLE 3: URL features (f1)
# Description
1 protocol used (http/https)
2 count of dots ‘.’ in FreeURL
3 count of level domains
4 length of the URL
5 length of the FQDN
6 length of the mld
7 count of terms in the URL
8 count of terms in the mld
All eight features are
extracted from the starting
URL (8) and landing URL
(8). The mean, median and
standard deviation values are
computed for features 3-8
on the following sets of
URLs: internal logged links,
external logged links, inter-
nal HREF links and external
HREF links (4∗6∗3). Feature
1 is computed on these sets as a ratio of URLs using https over the
total count of URLs for each set (4∗1). Feature 2 is computed only
for the starting and landing URLs. Thus, the complete URL-based
feature set (f1) consists of 92 features: 8+8+4∗(6∗3+1) = 92.
Term usage consistency: The second set of features (f2) captures
the consistency of term usage between different types (controlled
vs. uncontrolled; constrained vs. unconstrained) of data sources
in the page. Using 12 term distributions (we discard Dcopyright)
defined in Sect. 4.2, we create 68 features (12 ∗ 11/2 + 2) as
follows. 66 features depict the similarity of pairs of sources by
computing pairwise Hellinger Distance between their distributions
(12 ∗ 11/2). The Hellinger Distance [20] is a metric used to
quantify the dissimilarity between two probabilistic distributions
P and Q. It is an instance of f -divergence that is symmetric and
bounded in [0, 1]. The value 1 represents complete dissimilarity
(P ∩ Q = ∅) and the value 0 means that P and Q are the
same probabilistic distribution. We stress the importance of two
distributions by defining two additional binary features set to 1
if any word from Dintrdn, or Dextrdn respectively, is present in
Dtitle.
Usage of starting and landing mld: Legitimate websites are
likely to register a domain name reflecting the brand or the
service they represent. However, phishers often use domain names
having no relation with their target [10]. Hence, we expect the
starting mld and/or the landing mld to appear in several sources
extracted from a legitimate webpage while phishs should not
have this characteristic. We define 32 features (f3) inferring the
usage of the starting and landing mld in the text, the title and
FreeURL of the logged links and HREF links. 12 binary features
are set to 1 if the starting/landing mld appear in Dtext, Dtitle,
Dintlog , Dextlog , Dintlink or Dextlink (6*2). 20 features are
the sum of probability from terms of Dtitle, Dintlog , Dextlog ,
Dintlink and Dextlink that are substrings of starting/landing mld
(5*2) or that are substrings of starting/landing FreeURL, but not
substrings of starting/landing mld (5*2). The latter 10 features
6outline obfuscation techniques that use keywords of the target in
FreeURL. Dtext is not considered since it is often composed of
many short irrelevant terms that match several parts of a mld.
RDN usage: We define 13 features (f4) related to RDN usage
consistency. We compute statistics related to the use of similar and
different RDNs in starting URL, landing URL, redirection chain,
loaded content (logged links) and HREF links. We expect legit-
imate webpages to use more internal RDNs and less redirection
than phishs [21].
Webpage content: Finally, five features (f5) count the number of
terms in the text and the title (2), and the number of input fields,
images and IFrames (3) in the page. Phishs tend to have minimal
text to circumvent text-based detection techniques [22] and use
more images and HTML content loaded from other sources. In
addition, since phishing attacks seek to steal user data, phishs
often contain several input fields [10].
Recalling the requirements formulated in Sect 3.1, it is worth
noting that while we use terms to compute our feature set, it is
not based on any observed language or term usage knowledge.
The computation relies solely on the information gathered through
a web browser (R4, R5). Hence, the feature set is context-
independent (R2) and the use of non-static features mitigates the
risk for adversarial attacks on the machine learning model (R3).
Furthermore, since the feature set is small (210 features), we
expect it to be fast to compute once the data sources are available
(R6).
4.4 Phish Detection Model
To use our feature set for discriminating phishs from legitimate
ones, we use a supervised machine learning approach. In super-
vised machine learning, a classification model is learned from
observations over a set of data labeled with several classes. The
learned model is used to predict the class of unlabeled instances.
We use Gradient Boosting [23] to build the classification model
because (a) of its strong ability to select and weight the most
relevant features and (b) boosting algorithms are known to be
fairly robust to overfitting, enabling the resulting model to have
good generalization capabilities [24].
Gradient Boosting predicts the class of an unknown instance
by computing values defined in [0, 1] that gives the confidence
of the instance to belong to a given class. In the case of pre-
dicting only two classes, the confidence value v1 for one class
is equal to 1 − v2, where v2 is the confidence value for the
other class. A discrimination threshold predicts, according to the
computed confidence values, the class of an instance. By tuning
this threshold, we can favor the prediction of one class over the
other. The variation of the discrimination threshold over [0, 1] is
used to evaluate the accuracy of a given model by examining how
false positive rate varies with true positive rate (ROC) or precision
varies with recall.
5 TARGET IDENTIFICATION
The identification of the target of a phish relies on a set of
“keyterms” in that webpage related to a brand or service. Rather
than leveraging any brand-specific knowledge or text corpus to
infer these keyterms [25], [26], we introduce a new technique that
uses only the information extracted from the webpage.
5.1 Keyterms Extraction
A keyterm is one that appears in several data sources (e.g., title,
text and landing URL) on a page. We use terms from five data
sources introduced in Sect. 2.3 that contain user-visible data
rendered by the browser:
• Starting and landing URLs:
Tstart ∪ Tstartrdn ∪ Tland ∪ Tlandrdn
• Title: Ttitle
• Text: Ttext
• Copyright: Tcopyright
• HREF links: Tintlink ∪ Textlink
We use two different techniques to identify keyterms. They are
used in sequence, depending on the information available in dif-
ferent data sources and the success of each technique (Sect. 5.2).
The first technique considers the result of pairwise intersection
between the five sets of terms as potential keyterms. Each term
appearing in at least two data sources is added to a list and ranked
in descending order according to a term’s overall frequency in the
visible parts of the website. The top-N terms in the ordered list are
selected as keyterms. (We use N=5 in our model as it was proved
to be a sufficient number to represent a webpage [27].) These
N keyterms are called boosted prominent terms. The second tech-
nique considers the same data sources but discards the intersection
between text and HREF links (Ttext ∩ (Tintlink ∪ Textlink)). In
certain scenarios, the text and links of a webpage contain the same
terms because the name of the links and the corresponding URL
can be the same. This is common practice in news websites. In
such cases, the intersection terms may be dominated by terms that
are irrelevant for target identification, which may introduce some
noise in the keyterms inference. The N extracted keyterms using
this technique are called prominent terms.
5.2 Identification Process
We now discuss how the extracted keyterms lists (boosted promi-
nent terms and prominent terms) are used to infer the target of a
phish.
Step 1: Extract boosted prominent terms, and try to “guess” the
target FQDN. The mlds from the starting and landing URLs, from
the logged links and HREF links are collected. Thereafter, every
collected mld is checked to figure out if it can be composed
based on the keyterms part of boosted prominent terms possibly
separated by a dash ‘-’ or a string of digits. For each guessed
FQDN (typically 2-3), a search engine query is performed and
the returned RDNs are stored. If the RDNs of the suspected
phish (starting and landing URL) appear in the results of the
search engine query, we declare this site legitimate and stop the
process. Otherwise we go to step 2. This decision is based on the
assumption that a search engine would not return a phishing site
as a top hit because (a) a new phishing site (only a few hours old)
would not have been indexed by a search engine yet and (b) an
old phishing site would have been already detected and ended up
in a blacklist.
Step 2: The set of N prominent terms is queried against a search
engine. If the suspected RDN appears in the set of RDNs returned
by the search engine, it is declared legitimate and we stop the
process. If some mlds resulting form the search engine query
appear in a controlled data source of the webpage, we record
them and go to step 4. These mlds represent the candidate targets.
Alternatively, we continue to step 3.
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Fig. 5: Accuracy metrics evolution for the phish detection system
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 but instead of using prominent terms,
use boosted prominent terms. If the webpage is not confirmed
as legitimate, go to step 4.
Step 4 (target selection): For each mld candidate target, we count
how many times it appears in the data sources of the webpage and
rank it in a list according to this criteria. Off-the-Hook depicts the
three most frequent (i.e., top-3) potential targets in its warning
message. If a single target is required, we can return top-1.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the performance evaluation of the phish
detection system and the target identification method presented in
Sect. 4 and 5 respectively. The accuracy evaluation was performed
offline with an instrumented version of Off-the-Hook on datasets
previously captured.
6.1 Evaluation Datasets
We obtained URLs from two sources in order to gather ground
truth data of phishs and legitimate webpages (Tab. 4). Neither
dataset contains personal data and both datasets are available on
request for research use.
The set of phishing URLs (Phish) was obtained through the
community website PhishTank [4]. We conducted three different
collection “campaigns”. The first campaign resulted in phishTrain
which was used for training the phish detection classifier. The
second campaign, perfromed at a later point in time (4-10 months),
resulted in phishTest which was used as the test set. PhishTest
consists of webpages in a variety of languages. PhishTest1K is
a random sample of phishTest used for testing the classification
model with a realistic phishing to legitimate webpage distribution
(≈ 1/100) [2], [27]. We manually determined the language of
each webpage in phishTest1K. It is composed of 84% English
webpages, 6% French, 4% Japanese, 2% German and 4% other
languages (including Spanish and Portuguese). The last campaign
resulted in phishBrand that was used for evaluating our target
identification scheme (Sect. 6.3). PhishBrand consists of 600
phishs for each of which we manually identified the target, re-
sulting in a total of 126 different targets. Each campaign consisted
of checking for new entries in PhishTank every hour and scraping
the webpages (in several languages) for those URLs. The datasets
were further manually sanitized to remove any legitimate or
unavailable websites and parked domain names. Tab. 4 provides
a detailed description of these datasets including the collection
period and the count of URLs before and after sanitization.
The legitimate URLs (Leg) were provided by Intel Security.
An English training set (legTrain) is composed of 8,500 legitimate
TABLE 4: Datasets description
Set Name Collection Period Initial Clean Alexa
Phish phishTrain 15-Jul-23/Sep-9 2,766 1,500 –
phishTest 16-Jan-22/Jun-10 21,531 13,309 –
phishTest1K 16-Jan-22/Jun-10 – 1,000 –
phishBrand 15-Sep-22/Sep-28 600 600 –
Leg legTrain 15-Jul-22/Aug-01 8,500 – 56%
English 15-Aug-17/Sep-23 100,000 – 61%
French 16-Jul-29/Aug-17 20,000 – 18%
German 16-Jul-6/Jul-29 20,000 – 5%
Italian 16-Jul-5/Jul-29 20,000 – 11%
Portuguese 16-Jul-15/Aug-18 20,000 – 12%
Spanish 16- Jul-29/Aug-26 20,000 – 22%
webpages. Six larger test sets of webpages in different languages
(English, French, German, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish) were
gathered. A detailed description of these sets is provided in Tab. 4
with the percentage of webpage in each set having a RDN listed in
Alexa top 1M, depicting the diversity and popularity of the URLs.
6.2 Phish Classification
6.2.1 Accuracy and Language-Independence
We now present detailed evaluation of our phish detection method
across six different languages so as to demonstrate its language-
independence characteristics. The model was trained using leg-
Train (8,500) and phishTrain (1,500). The testing was done using
phishTest1K (1,000) and each language specific dataset, e.g.,
English (100,000), French (20,000), German (20,000), etc.
To begin this evaluation, we first compute Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) and corresponding Area Under the Curve
(AUC), which shows the change of false positive rate with respect
to true positive rate while varying the discrimination threshold
of the classifier. The evaluation results for legitimate dataset of
six languages are shown in Fig. 5a, wherein we see that, at a
significantly high true positive rate of 0.9, the false positive rate
for all languages is very low (<0.008). As the true positive rate
increases to around 0.95, the false positive rate does not increase
much. Even at true positive rate of 0.98, the false positive rate
stays substantially low at 0.02. In line with these results, the AUC
is around 0.999 for all languages, as shown in Tab. 5. Note that
these results are consistent across all languages, which is very
desirable in a multi-lingual phish detection scenario.
The detailed evaluation results for precision, recall and false
positive rate are shown in Tab. 5. These values were obtained
by setting the discrimination threshold of Gradient Boosting to
0.7, which favors the prediction of legitimate webpages ([0, 0.7[)
over phishs ([0.7, 1]). In this table, we see that our method
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achieves significantly high precision (0.92–0.98) and high recall
(around 0.95) for all languages. Hence, the F1-score, which is the
harmonic mean of precision and recall, is also significantly high
(0.93–0.97). The false positive rate is significantly low, i.e., in the
range of 0.0005–0.004, across all languages.
TABLE 5: Detailed accuracy evaluation of the phish detector alone
for six languages
Language Precision Recall F1-score FP Rate AUC
English 0.975 0.952 0.964 0.0002 0.999
French 0.937 0.952 0.944 0.0032 0.998
German 0.944 0.952 0.947 0.0028 0.997
Portuguese 0.949 0.952 0.950 0.0025 0.998
Italian 0.928 0.952 0.940 0.0037 0.998
Spanish 0.919 0.952 0.935 0.0042 0.998
In many large-scale, real-world scenarios (especially in web
security domain), a machine learning model is considered usable
only if it achieves high precision (e.g., 0.9 or 0.95) with significant
recall (e.g., 0.5 or 0.6) [28]. In order to test our method against
this criterion, we evaluated how recall of the proposed method
changes with precision by varying the discrimination threshold
from 0 to 1. The result is shown in Fig. 5b where we see that
when the precision is higher than 0.9, the recall for all languages
is significantly high and is always in the range of 0.60–0.96.
Obtaining high accuracy values in classification at a given
moment in time does not guarantee this accuracy will remain
high over time. Phishing techniques evolves and characteristics
captured by a classification model may not be valid forever. To
see how the detection capability (recall) of the model degrades
with time, we split phishTest in five subsets of equivalent size
(≈ 2, 500) according to the time they were captured. Fig. 5c
depicts the evolution of recall value computed on these subsets
(note that the latest entry in phishTrain was gathered on September
9, 2015). In this figure, we see that recall remains high (≈ 0.95)
across the time period of January 22 to June 10, 2016. This implies
that the model does not have to be retrained or updated fre-
quently, making Off-the-Hook suitable for real-life deployments.
The global recall on the 13,309 phishs of phishTest is 0.951 which
is consistent with the recall obtained with its subset phishTest1K
(0.952) in Tab. 5.
6.2.2 Feature Analysis
We now analyze the impact of each feature set and individual
features from Sect. 4.3 on phish classification. Fig. 6 shows the
weight of the 210 features. While we see that most features are
relevant, features related to the usage of starting and landing mld
(f3) have a small impact on classification with a weight always
lower than 0.01. The same observation holds for most term usage
consistency features (f2), apart from a few exceptions having
significant weight (> 0.01). This is also shown in Tab. 6 where we
see that features from f2 and f3 have the lowest average weight.
On the other hand, features form f4 and f5 have the highest impact
on classification with an average weight of 0.0084 and 0.0139
per feature respectively. One feature from each of these sets has a
strong weight (> 0.03) as can be observed in Tab. 7, which shows
the ten most important features of the classification model. URL
features from f1 predominantly impact the classification with a
global weight of 0.578 for this feature set and most features having
a significant weight as it can be seen in Fig. 6. Moreover, f1 has
six features in the ten most important of the model including the
two top features (Tab. 7).
TABLE 6: Feature set weight.
Set Weight Avg weightper feature
f1 0.578 0.0062
f2 0.185 0.0027
f3 0.058 0.0018
f4 0.109 0.0084
f5 0.070 0.0139
fall 1.0 0.0047
Looking at the most sig-
nificant features in Tab. 7, we
see that they come from differ-
ent sets (f1, f2, f4, f5) con-
firming the relevance of the
feature set definition process.
However, we also notice that
these most relevant features
rely predominantly on the data
source internal logged links
(features ranked 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10). Internal logged links cor-
respond to loaded resources controlled by the page owner and
unconstrained. These are parts where phishers use obfuscation
techniques by embedding keywords in FreeURL to lure their
victims.
TABLE 7: Top ten features of the classification model.
Rank Set Feature Weight
1 f1 mean # of terms in internal logged links 0.053
2 f1 length of starting URL 0.040
3 f4 count of external HREF links 0.040
4 f5 count of input fields 0.035
5 f2 Hellinger(Dintlog , Dstart) 0.031
6 f1 median length of internal logged links 0.027
7 f1 length of landing URL 0.027
8 f1 SD length of internal logged links 0.025
9 f2 Hellinger(Dintlog , Dtext) 0.021
10 f1 SD # of terms in internal logged links 0.020
6.3 Target Identification
To assess the performance of target identification, we used phish-
Brand dataset. Since target identification can provide up to three
9candidate targets for each phish, we evaluate the likelihood of
the correct target being in top-1, top-2 and top-3 results provided
by our method. Tab. 8 presents the count of correctly identified
targets, unknown targets and missed targets considering these three
sets. The last column gives the success rate of each method. The
17 pages with unknown target correspond to phishs that contained
only some input fields and no hint about the target. Hence, we
were not able to infer the target for these phishs with manual
analysis. Yet, we include these phishs with unknown targets for the
computation of the success rate. In Tab. 8, we see that the accuracy
of identifying the correct target (top-1) is 90.5%, and if the criteria
for identifying the correct target is expanded to top-3 then the
accuracy increases to 97.3%. These results are comparable to
the best state-of-the-art method for target identification [26] that
achieves a success rate of 92.1%. It is of note that 311 phishs
had only one identified potential target (top-1) and no alternative
targets. Hence, more than half of the phishing warnings raised
by Off-the-Hook would provide one redirection link to a unique
target.
TABLE 8: Target identification results
Targets Identified Unknown Missed Success rate
top-1 526 17 57 90.5%
top-2 558 17 25 95.8%
top-3 567 17 16 97.3%
6.4 Overall System Accuracy
To see how the target identification system complements the
phish detection system in Off-the-Hook, we fed the former with
misclassified legitimate webpages identified in Sect. 6.2.1. As
presented in Sect. 3.4, if an identified target RDN matches the
RDN of the landing URL, the website is considered as legitimate.
Off-the-Hook considers this criteria to avoid displaying warning
messages for legitimate webpages. Tab. 9 compares false positives
and precision of the standalone phish detector and of Off-the-
Hook. Accuracy, Recall and AUC are not compared since they
were not drastically improved (0.999/0.952/0.999). We can see
that overall the system combination reduces false positives by over
50%, missclassifying only 166 legitmate webpages as phish out of
200,000. This gives a final FP rate of 0.0008 and a precision of
0.975 to Off-the-Hook, which is comparable to the best state-of-
the-art phish detection system [2].
TABLE 9: Accuracy improvement using target identification.
Language Phish Detector Off-the-HookFP FP Rate Pre. FP FP Rate Pre.
English 24 0.0002 0.975 19 0.0002 0.980
French 64 0.0032 0.937 30 0.0015 0.969
German 57 0.0028 0.944 33 0.0016 0.966
Portuguese 51 0.0025 0.949 35 0.0017 0.964
Italian 74 0.0037 0.928 25 0.0012 0.974
Spanish 84 0.0042 0.919 24 0.0012 0.975
Overall 354 0.0018 0.955 166 0.0008 0.975
6.5 Computational System Requirements
To assess the time required for the computation steps presented
in Sect. 3.4 we report them as column headers in Tab. 10. It
depicts the mean, median and standard deviation of the time for
the full process of phish detection (1-7a) and target identification
(1-7b). This table also includes the performances excluding the
time needed for the data collection (1-4): (5-7a) and (5-7b). The
statistics regarding 6099 legitimate websites were gathered over a
6 weeks period of normal web browsing while 154 phishs were
visited on purpose. The laptop on which Off-the-Hook Firefox
version was installed has a 2.7GHz Intel Core i5 processor and
16GB memory. We can see that the time needed to classify
websites is under 250 ms. In case the phish detector makes a
false positive decision, thanks to the target identifier, we are able
to remove the loading screen in around 1.5 seconds (1772 - 220 =
1552 ms).
TABLE 10: Processing time in milliseconds for legitimate wep-
bages and phishs (column headers refer to steps in Fig. 3).
(1-4) (5-7b) (5-7a) (1-7b) (1-7a)
Mean 164 2,334 328 2,498 492
Legitimate Median 56 1,655 154 1,772 220
Stdev 497 2,369 571 2,482 829
Mean 72 1,986 150 2,058 222
Phishing Median 36 1,848 90 1,877 127
Stdev 158 1,615 297 1,642 297
TABLE 11: Memory footprint of Off-the-Hook components.
Dispatcher Phishdetector
Target
identifier Overall
Average 21.93 MB 120.62 MB 152.50 MB 295,05 MB
Stdev 0.22 MB 2.42 MB 4.36 MB 4.76 MB
Tab. 11 presents the average memory usage of the three
main components of Off-the-Hook system. In this table it can be
seen that while the dispatcher has a low (and stable) memory
consumption of 22 MB, the modules required for classification
increase the memory consumption of the phish detector to 120
MB. The two instances of the target identifier required 76 MB
each, which leads to an overall memory consumption of 295 MB
for the proposed Off-the-Hook system.
7 USABILITY STUDY
To test first-time users’ perception of Off-the-Hook from a us-
ability perspective, we conducted two user studies. The lab test
investigated its intuitive understandability and users’ behavioral
responses in a lab setting. The field test involved installing it on
the participant’s own laptop to study potential interference with
general laptop use and produce genuine reactions in a naturalistic
setting. This section describes both tests and their main results.
All the questionnaires used in the tests are publicly available [29].
7.1 Test settings
7.1.1 Lab test
The purpose of this study was to display Off-the-Hook to a naive
user, inquiring whether they understand the warning and safe toast
notification’s contents, how they would continue after seeing the
warning banner, and whether they prefer Off-the-Hook to its well-
established alternative, Firefox’s warning of phishing (called “web
forgery” there). The lab test is a qualitative study that makes no
statistical claims.
Participants: Ten participants were recruited for the lab test, most
via emails sent to student mailing lists and some by contacting
them in person. Results from the background questionnaire are
provided in Tab. 12.
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TABLE 12: Results from background questionnaire
Lab test Field test
Number of participants 10 18
Age
20–24 4 10
25–29 6 4
30–34 0 3
> 50 0 1
Gender Female 3 11Male 7 7
Education
High school 0 5
Bachelor’s degree 4 7
Master’s degree 6 4
Doctoral degree 0 2
Main purpose of
laptop use
Work 3 5
Study 5 7
Personal 2 6
Internet use
(hours per day)
1–3 3 7
3–5 4 6
5–7 2 4
> 7 1 1
Browser
Mozilla Firefox 4 7
Google Chrome 5 11
Safari 1 0
Knowledge about
phishing
Knowledgeable 10 15
Uninformed 0 3
Materials: The test involved the participant opening three links
provided in fake emails on a test laptop with Windows 10, Google
Chrome and Off-the-Hook installed. The links were verified before
each test session to trigger the appropriate banners. An image of
Firefox’s web forgery warning was additionally shown to the user.
Procedure: We advised the participant to open three email links
consecutively. The first link led to a safe website, indicated by the
green badge on the navigation bar. The second link brought up
the warning message. We asked the participant various questions
concerning the banner’s content and appearance. Next, we showed
the participant a picture of Firefox’s web forgery warning and
asked them to compare the two banners. Finally, a third link was
opened, first leading to the loading screen and then to the safe toast
notification. We gathered the participant’s assessments of it. At the
end of the test the participant filled out an additional questionnaire
containing similar questions as asked during the test, with pre-
provided answer options on a Likert scale.
Ethical considerations No personal information apart from the
explicit discussion and questionnaires was gathered.
7.1.2 Field test
The purpose of this test was twofold: (a) to see whether the pres-
ence of the application has a negative impact on user experience,
and (b) to test how users react to the banners during normal laptop
use.
Participants: 18 people took part in the test. Most were recruited
via emails sent to student mailing lists, and some by contacting
them in person. Results from the background questionnaire are
provided in Tab. 12. It is worth noting that our test subjects
were all university students or had graduated from a university.
Their educational backgrounds range across all levels of higher
education and their time usage of Internet is equally distributed
though, which provides a fair representativity.
Materials: The study was conducted on each participant’s own
laptop by installing Off-the-Hook on the user’s own laptop for
one week and a fake version for another week. The fake version
displays the same icon on the navigation bar as Off-the-Hook, but
without performing any other processes.
Procedure: The within-subjects approach was used in this study.
Each participant used both the real and fake version of Off-the-
Hook for one week, and the order of the real and fake application
was evenly distributed among the participants. The only prior
information given to the participants was that we are installing
a browser add-on. The same questionnaire was filled in after
both weeks, asking the user to choose between Strongly disagree
and Strongly agree on a five-point Likert scale as reactions to
the statements displayed in Tab. 13. There was further space in
the questionnaire for freely written qualitative answers. After the
two weeks, the participants were asked whether they remembered
having been exposed to any of the banners during the test period.
Those who did answered the same questionnaire as in the lab test,
inquiring about the understandability, appearance and usability of
each banner.
Ethical considerations: No personal information apart from the
explicit questionnaires was gathered. We did not record the partic-
ipants’ browsing history.
7.2 Results
7.2.1 Lab test
All users understood the purpose of the warning banner, although
this took more time for some. There were no major misunderstand-
ings of textual content. The continuation options were recognized
fast and evaluated as useful by the majority of participants.
The link to the target site was noticed and understood without
complications. When the banner appeared, every participant chose
to close the tab, the majority (6) from the browser and the rest
(4) from the banner. Seven out of ten users preferred Off-the-
Hook to Firefox’s web forgery warning. Firefox’s was deemed
more difficult to understand due to technical jargon. Further,
Firefox’s banner contains no link to the target website, and many
users preferred Off-the-Hook due to this. On the negative side,
Off-the-Hook was considered by some to be less “professional”
in appearance than Firefox’s banner. Participants were divided
on the safe toast notification, six out of ten finding it useful.
Some considered it redundant given that the navigation bar icon
already displays the relevant information of the website being safe.
Problematically, no user correctly guessed the reason why some
safe sites brought up the safe toast notification but others did not.
7.2.2 Field test
During the two-week test, 12 of the 18 participants had seen
the loading screen, nine had seen the warning banner, and nine
had seen the safe toast notification. One participant had seen
another phishing warning instead of Off-the-Hook. Results from
the questionnaire filled by all participants after having first the
fake and then the real Off-the-Hook installed, or vice versa, are
provided in Tab. 13.
A difference between the real and fake Off-the-Hook was
found in the reported slowing down of the browser. When the
fake app was installed, only one user agreed with the claim My
browsing has slowed down, whereas seven agreed after having
the real Off-the-Hook installed, giving a statistically significant
result with both The Wilcoxon signed ranks test and the sign test.
However, a similar slowing effect was not found in general laptop
functioning. Since the most likely reason why Off-the-Hook would
affect browsing speed would be that it slows down the whole
laptop, it is likely that many participants simply did not notice this
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TABLE 13: Results of Wilcoxon signed ranks test (two-tailed) and sign test (two-tailed) between answers to fake and real Off-the-Hook.
Last column indicates whether the real software elicited more agreement (Agree) or disagreement (Disagree) than the fake one.
Claim Wilcoxon signed ranks test Sign test DirectionTies Z p W / Crit. Signif. Z p Signif.
My browsing has slowed down 8 -2.80 0.005 0 / 8 Yes 3 0.003 Yes Agree
I have been annoyed by the presence of the program 6 -2.82 0.005 3 / 13 Yes 2.83 0.005 Yes Agree
My computer has slowed down in general 6 -1.37 0.170 21.5 / 13 No 1 0.317 No -
The program has interfered with my browsing 4 -2.82 0.005 7.5 / 21 Yes 2.89 0.004 Yes Agree
The program has interfered with my use of the laptop in general 9 -2.67 n/a 0 / 5 Yes 2.24 0.025 Yes Agree
Use of my laptop has been as enjoyable as before 5 -2.90 0.004 4 / 17 Yes 2.64 0.008 Yes Disagree
The program has prevented me from doing something I wanted 10 -1.40 n/a 8 / 3 No 1.41 0.157 No -
The browser has crashed more often than usual 11 -0.25 n/a 12.5 / 2 No 0 1 No -
Other programs have crashed more often than usual 12 -0.94 n/a 6 / 0 No 1 0.317 No -
for other aspects of their laptop use. Possibly, the loading screen
may also have been judged by some as slowing down browsing.
Off-the-Hook also seemed to have a negative impact on laptop
use experience, with ca. half of the users agreeing with the
statement I have been annoyed by the presence of the program for
the real but not the fake app. Most of these users had witnessed
the warning banner mistakenly appearing on safe sites, which is
likely a significant cause for this negative result. As demonstrated
in Sect. 6.4, the overall false positive rate of Off-the-Hook is low.
However, among safe sites that brought up the warning were a
university email site and an online bank, both of which were
popular among test participants. Even if the false positive rate
is low in principle, only one instance of it suffices to negatively
impact user experience. We discuss this issue further in Sect. 7.3.
There was no significant change between the real and the fake
app in how often the browser or other programs were reported
to have crashed. Results concerning the proposition “The program
has prevented me from doing something I wanted” further indicate
that Off-the-Hook did not stop the users from browsing as they
wished, in case they wanted to disregard it. There was one ex-
ception to this, where a user reported the loading screen blocking
access to a website. Presumably this was due to the slow speed of
the participant’s laptop, since the participant reported seeing the
loading screen but none of the banners. This raises the issue of
whether an exit link should be incorporated to the loading screen
to allow the user to close the tab during the loading. The majority
of participants understood the warning banner correctly, and it
received a generally positive rating on text content and visual
appearance. All the continuation links were considered useful on
average. Nine users had seen the safe toast notification, five of
whom it had made feel safer about the website. Some considered
it difficult to interpret, and most would have preferred more
information on it. Nevertheless, the majority found it unnecessary.
It is worth noting that the field test featured a moderate number
of 18 participants. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test considers the
number of data points in calculating the critical value of the W
statistic. Nevertheless, it rendered strongly significant results for
all statements in Table 13 except one: The program has interfered
with my use of the laptop in general.
7.3 Discussion
Both tests indicate that users generally interpreted the warning
banner correctly, and were thus able to make an informed deci-
sion on how to proceed. Its textual understandability and visual
appearance were also deemed appropriate on average. Most users
found all the continuation options useful, and no user advocated
the removal of any of them. The ease of understanding of the
textual content and the variety of continuation options were both
appreciated in comparison to Firefox’ phishing warning. The
negative impacts on user experience were largely due to false
positives, and can be remedied by establishing a global whitelist
containing popular websites that are falsely treated as phish by
Off-the-Hook.
The interpretation and appreciation of the safe toast notifica-
tion were somewhat less clear, as some considered it redundant but
others found it helpful. No user correctly guessed why it appears
on some sites and not others, which is potentially problematic.
Removing the safe toast notification would be a possible remedy
for this, given that the same information is also present at the
navigation bar. The main usability problem with this would be
that the loading screen may result in confusion or suspicion, since
it currently has no information. Adding a simple text, such as
“checking” along with a progress bar would remedy this issue.
In summary, the following modification suggestions emerged
from the usability studies:
• establishing a global whitelist to exclude common false
positives
• removing the safe toast notification
• adding a small explanatory text to the loading screen
• adding an exit link to the loading screen
8 RELATED WORK
Phish detection: Analysis of the content [10], [27] and code
execution (e.g. the use of javascript, pop-up windows, etc.) [38] of
a webpage provides relevant information to identify phishs. Some
detection methods rely on URL lexical obfuscation characteristics
[12], [33] and webpage hosting related features [30], [39] to decide
if a webpage is a phish. The visual similarity of a phish with
its target was also exploited to detect phishs [31], [40]. Visual
similarity analysis presupposes that a potential target is known a
priori though, limiting its applicability. In contrast, Off-the-Hook
identifies phishs and discovers their targets.
Multi-criteria methods [1], [2] have been proved the most
efficient to detect phishs. These techniques use a combination of
webpage features (HTML terms, links, frame, etc.), connection
features (HTML header, redirection, etc.) and host based features
(DNS, IP, ASN, geolocation, etc.) to infer webpage legitimacy.
The identification method uses machine learning techniques fed
with hundreds of thousands of these features, which are mostly
static and learned from training sets containing data such as
IP address, Autonomous System Number (ASN), bag-of-words
for different data sources (webpage, URL, etc.). This limits the
generalizability of the approach that is context-dependant and it
requires large training datasets, numbering hundreds of thousand
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TABLE 14: Phish detection systems evaluation and accuracy comparison
Testing set Legitimate Train Leg
Technique Legitimate Phish set /Test /Phish Evaluation FPR Precision Recall Accuracy
Ma et al. [30] 15,000 20,500 DMOZ 1/1 3/4 cross-validation 0.001 0.998 0.924 0.955
Whittaker et al. [2] 1,499,109 16,967 several 6/1 90/1 old/new 0.0001 0.989 0.915 0.999
Thomas et al. [1] 500,000 500,000 several 4/1 1/1 cross-validation 0.003 0.961 0.734 0.866
Chen et al. [31] 404 1,945 top Alexa 9/1 1/5 cross-validation 0.007 0.992 1 0.994
Cantina [27] 2,100 19 English - 110/1 no learning 0.03 0.212 0.89 0.969
Cantina+ [32] 1,868 940 several 1/4 2/1 old/new 0.013 0.964 0.955 0.97
Xiang et al. [10] 7,906 3,543 several - 2/1 no learning 0.019 0.957 0.9 0.955
Ramesh et al. [25] 1,200 3,374 top Alexa - 1/3 no learning 0.005 0.998 0.996 0.996
PhishStorm [33] 48,009 48,009 DMOZ 9/1 1/1 cross-validation 0.014 0.984 0.913 0.949
Kausar et al. [34] 71 89 unknown 81/1 1/1 unknown 0.112 0.888 0.887 0.875
PhishShield [35] 250 1,600 PhishTank - 1/6 no learning 0.0004 0.999 0.971 0.966
Jain et al. [36] 405 1,120 top Alexa - 1/1 no learning 0.015 0.993 0.861 0.894
Varshney et al. [37] 2,500 500 top Alexa - 5/1 no learning 0.076 0.723 0.995 0.936
Off-the-Hook 100,000 1,000 English 1/10 100/1 old/new 0.0002 0.980 0.952 0.999
Off-the-Hook 200,000 2,000 several 1/20 100/1 old/new 0.0008 0.975 0.951 0.999
of webpages [2]. Finally, their computation is reportedly costly [1]
and use [2] some proprietary features preventing usage on end-user
devices, in contrast to our fully client-side approach.
Client-side techniques: Alternative light-weight and simpli-
fied implementations of multi-criteria methods [3] do not consider
that many features and are used on the client-side, but are less
efficient than implementing the same technique server-side [2]. In
a similar manner, detection techniques relying on fixed heuristics
(Alexa ranking, Google pagerank, etc.) are deployed as client-
side phishing protection systems [34], [35], [36] but also exhibit
high rate of missclassification [34], [36] or are not able to render
decisions for all webpages [35]. Furthermore, static heuristics in
client-side solutions can be easily discovered by an attacker and
circumvented. Obfuscating the detection model which uses static
features (e.g. bag-of-words) [3] does not prevent such attackers
to perform adversarial machine learning [7]. In contrast, our
detection model considers phishers’ limitations, which provides
better accuracy and resilience to this class of attack.
Other methods focused, as we do, on the study of terms that
compose the data sources of a webpage [12], [33] and admit
client-side implementation. Cantina [27], [32] was among the first
systems to propose a lexical analysis of terms that comprise a
webpage. In Cantina [27] key terms are selected using TF-IDF to
provide a unique signature of a webpage. Using this signature in
a search engine, Cantina infers the legitimacy of a webpage. A
similar method [10], based on TF-IDF and Google search, checks
for inconsistency between a webpage identity and the identity it
impersonates to identify phish. The main difference between these
methods and ours is language independence since these methods
rely on TF-IDF computation to infer their keyterms. An alternative
to TF-IDF computation is to use domain name and page title to
perform the search query and confirm a webpage as legitimate if
its domain name appear in the top-6 results of Google’s query [37].
Nevertheless, all these techniques [10], [27], [32], [33], [37] need
to perform search queries for each page to analyze which is
time and resource consuming. In contrast, Off-the-Hook resorts
to search queries in a few occasions when the phishing detector
first identifies a webpage as a phish and target identification is thus
required. The analysis of webpages identified as legitimate by the
phishing detector do not trigger any search query. Those represent
the vast majority (>99%) of visited webpages.
Accuracy comparison: Tab. 14 presents comparative accu-
racy results of Off-the-Hook to the most relevant state-of-the-art
systems. Techniques at the top only admit centralized deployment,
while others admit a client-side implementation as Off-the-Hook.
We present the size of the testing sets used to evaluate each system
and the provenance of the legitimate set, showing how represen-
tative the set is. For example, using popular websites (such as top
Alexa sites) [25], [31] as the legitimate set is not representative.
The ratio of training to testing instances (Train/Test) indicates the
scalability of the method and the ratio of legitimate to phishing
instances (Leg/Phish) shows the extent to which the experiments
represent a real world distribution (≈ 100/1) [2], [27]. We also
identify the evaluation method (e.g., cross-validation vs. training
with old data and testing with new data). Finally, we present
several metrics for assessing the classification performance. If
data for any of the columns were missing from the original
paper describing the system, we estimated them. For comparison
purposes, if several experimental setups were proposed in a paper,
we selected the most relevant to assess their practical efficacy
using the following ordered criteria:
1) learning and testing instances are different,
2) the ratio of legitimate webpage to phish in the testing set is
representative of real world observations (≈ 100/1),
3) the learning set is older than the testing set,
4) the false positive rate (FPR) is minimized.
A low false positive rate is paramount for a phish detection
technique, since this relates to the proportion of legitimate web-
pages to which a user will be incorrectly denied. We can see that
among the most relevant state-of-the-art techniques, only three [2],
[30], [35] have comparable false positive rates to ours (≤ 0.001).
Two of them [2], [30] do not admit client-side implementation,
thus raising concerns like user privacy and delay in phish identifi-
cation [5] that we previously identified.
The technique proposed by Ma et al. [30] has a lower accuracy
than in our system (0.955 < 0.999). In addition, they use a testing
set that does not represent real world distribution (legitimate to
phish ratio of 3:4). Further the parameters they used for cross-
validation (1:1 ratio for learning to testing instances) do not assess
the scalability of the approach. Whittaker et al. [2] report results
similar to us in several metrics. However, they use a huge training
set (>9M instances) and their test set is actually smaller than the
training set (a sixth, at 1.5M)! Scalability and language-/brand-
independence are likely to be poor since they use 100,000 mostly
static features (bag-of-words). PhishShield [35] is a client-side
solution that has high precision and low false positive rate. It
was evaluated on a very small testing dataset of 1,850 instances
containing only 250 legitimate webpages, which raises concerns
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about how representative the results are. Nevertheless, this system
has lower accuracy (0.966) than Off-the-Hook and is not able to
render a decision for every analyzed webpage, i.e. more than 2%
of the pages evaluated did not get a decision.
In contrast to the state-of-the-art in phish detection, Off-the-
Hook is a client-side application that is context-independent,
resilient to phishing attacks evolution and does not rely on access
to external sources, while performing better than or as well as the
state-of-the-art.
Target identification: One proposal [25] was to use a similar
technique as Cantina with keywords retrieval and Google search to
discover a list of potential target as the top results of the search, but
the authors do not report accuracy figures for target identification.
Similarly, extracting the logo from a webpage screenshot and
using it in Google Image Search leads to identify the target of
87.0% of phishs in [41]. HREF links have been used to build
community graphs of webpages. By counting the mutual links
between two webpages and further performing visual similarity
analysis between suspicious webpages, Wenyin et al. [26] identify
the target of a given phish with an accuracy of 92.1%. However,
this technique is slow because of the need to crawl many additional
websites to build the community graph. Conditional Random
Fields and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) have been applied to
phishing email content to identify their target [22] with a success
rate of 88.1%. The technique we propose, in contrast to previous
techniques is language-independent for keyterms inference. It is as
efficient as any state-of-the-art solutions achieving a success rate
of 90.5-97.3%.
9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
9.1 Meeting Design Goals
Accuracy (R1): Sect. 6.2 shows that our feature set yielded results
that outperform most previous work. The main reason is the new
separation scheme applied to data sources related to their level
of control and constraints (Sect. 4.1). This is evident from the
weight in classification model of features from the set f1 that
comprises URL features separated accordingly to constraint and
control considerations. Accuracy is improved by the target iden-
tifier, which helps reducing false positives by over 50% without
impacting negatively other accuracy measures (Sect. 6.4). This
makes Off-the-Hook comparable to the best existing technique [2]
in term of accuracy (FP Rate < 0.001 and recall > 0.95) while
relying on fewer features and less training data.
Context-independent detection (R2): As presented in Sect. 4.3,
none of our 210 features rely on static observations (e.g word, IP
address, ASN). It makes phish detection context-independent and
very accurate regardless of language or targeted brand.
Temporal resilience (R3): The separation of controlled and con-
strained data sources models inherent limitations in webpage
composition, that will remain over time. It explains why the
phish detection rate (recall) of Off-the-Hook remains high and
constant several months after the detection model was trained, as
highlighted in Sect. 6.2.1. The detection model is also more robust
to adversarial machine learning attacks since, while knowing fea-
tures used for classification, phishers cannot modify constrained
and uncontrolled part of their phishs. Hence, they cannot easily
circumvent detection.
Resilience to dynamic phishing (R4): It is guaranteed by design
since Off-the-Hook analyses the actual webpage content depicted
in the browser to render its decision.
User privacy (R5): With the fully-client-side implementation, all
information the phish detector needs is available locally and no
browsing information is shared with any third party. The target
identification process requires some requests to search engine,
which can leak some browsing information. However, this process
is triggered only when a page is first identified as phish, which
occurs rarely.
Effective protection (R6): The fast decision making of Off-the-
Hook, with a median time lower than 0.2 seconds to block
interaction and warning in less than 2 seconds, prevents users from
disclosing any sensitive information to a phisher (Sect. 6.5). The
several banners and their global design are deemed appropriate for
phishing protection as highlighted in the usability studies (Sect. 7).
Off-the-Hook warning is preferred over that of Firefox. Similarly,
the new continuation option to the target of the phish received
positive feedback from participants who would appreciate such a
feature in warnings from other protection software.
9.2 False Warnings
We now discuss possible causes for false warnings.
The term extraction technique that guarantees language in-
dependence raised some issues. We chose to split strings at any
non-alphabetic character and to only consider terms composed
of at least three characters to discard stop words and recurrent
short terms having no significance. This negatively impacted term
distribution comparisons. Long subdomains such as theinstantex-
change or insuranceservicenow were considered as single term.
In contrast, short domain name string corresponding to brand
and composed of separating characters (digit, hyphen, etc.) such
as dl4a, s2mr or e-go were split and the resulting terms were
discarded as too short. The inconsistent usage of abbreviations or
acronyms like intl for international also had a negative impact.
Most legitimate webpages misclassified by the phish detector had
one of these characteristics although they were largely confirmed
as legitimate by the target identifier, preventing to raise a warning.
Other misidentified webpages were hosting content not related
to their domain name and mostly very little and generic content.
One common example was login webpage for private webmail
service using popular webmail provider (e.g. Outlook, Gmail).
These webpages were identical to the regular login page of the
provider but hosted on a different domain name e.g. Outlook
login interface hosted on mail.aalto.fi. This misled the phish
detector and the target identifier, which identified the website of
the service provider as the target i.e. live.com for Outlook. From
a system and human perspectives these webpages are similar to
phishing webpages. The only means to assert the trustworthiness
of these websites is using prior knowledge about the private
webmail service being hosted on a given domain name, since
in most cases these websites did not use SSL/TLS certificate.
Having this knowledge, one can add an exception in the local
whitelist to prevent warnings from appearing again. Alternatively,
to avoid disturbance to first time users, a global whitelist could be
implemented. as pointed in Sect. 7.3. This can be fed with crowd-
sourced feedback from Off-the-Hook users related to their choice
to proceed and do not display the warning again for a website
raising a warning. Such a solution would need though further
verification and protection mechanism to prevent phishers from
manipulating this global whitelisting system in order to bypass
detection.
Some empty/unavailable webpages and parked domain names
were also identified as phishs. The former is explained by the
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lack of information contained in empty/unavailable webpages.
Several parked domain names use similar composition schemes
and obfuscation techniques as phishing domains [42] and may
have been previously used in such a malicious activity [43]. From
the point of view of our classification system, some parked pages
have the same characteristics as phishs. This misclassification of
unavailable and parked domain names is not of major concern
though since, for the former no content access is prevented since
the link point empty resources. For the latter, domain parking is
considered as spam by major Internet actors (e.g. Google) and
some efficient state-of-the-art techniques [42] can be applied to
discard these webpages from phishing identification.
9.3 Evasion Techniques
One way to evade detection is to use IP-based URLs. A lower
detection rate was observed for such phishs. However, relying on
IP address rather than domain names deprives phishers from the
flexibility brought by the DNS to change the hosting location of
their phishing content while keeping the same link. Moreover, IP
blacklisting is widely used to prevent access to malicious hosting
infrastructure.
Another evasion technique is to limit the text content available
in a webpage: use few external links, do not load external content
and build short URLs. We observed some of these techniques
actually being used individually in webpages used for evaluation.
They did not impact classifier performance because even though
they prevent some features from being computed, others, such
as those based on title, starting/landing URL and logged links
could still lead to effective detection of phishs. Simultaneous use
of multiple evasion techniques may impact classifier performance.
However, using such subterfuges would degrade the quality of the
phish and reduce the number of victims.
Off-the-Hook is resilient to dynamic phishing in which phish-
ers serve different content depending on who the client is. How-
ever, delayed generation of DOM elements or dynamic Javascript
on a webpage may affect the feature extraction process. Dynami-
cally generated elements may not be present just after a webpage
is loaded and thus not captured in our data sources. However,
this would not have a severe impact on classification accuracy.
Some features related to HTML source code may not be computed
accurately but features related to starting URL, landing URL,
redirection chain and logged links will be accurately computed
anyway and have shown to be efficient at detecting phishs (Sec-
tion 6.2). Furthermore, dynamic generation of webpage elements
may tip-off potential victims noticing changes taking place on
the rendered webpage after long delays. Techniques to detect
modifications in webpages after loading have been proposed [44]
and could be used to trigger a new data source extraction for Off-
the-Hook to rerun the decision process.
We consider RDNs that are not in the redirection chain as being
outside the control of an attacker: external. However, knowing
our scheme a phisher can include links to domain names he
registered in a phish, while not using them for redirection. The
phisher can thus freely define URLs that our system assumes to be
uncontrolled. This can decrease the recall of our method and ease
circumvention. Retraining the model once this attack starts to be
used would cope with this issue. External links features would be
given lower weight in the classification model since they would
start to be less discriminative.
A final probable evasion technique is to use typosquatting
domains and misspelled terms in the different data sources we
analyze. When different but similar terms like paypal, paypaI or
paipal are used in different sources, our distributions comparison
metric would not infer any similarity. The classifier would thus
probably conclude that the webpage is legitimate. However, the
presence of reference links to the target would disclose the real
target. In addition, misspellings may tip-off potential victims.
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